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Abstract: Mongolia is the one of the resource rich countries facing 
natural resource curse, relatively transparent with satisfactory resource 
governance. Some would argue establishing sovereign wealth fund (SWF) 
is beneficial those countries with natural resource curse while others 
against it. Mongolian government established several SWFs and namely 
Human Development Fund (HDF- afterwards renamed as Future Heritage 
Fund) and Fiscal Stability Fund (FSF) but still facing to create an efficient 
SWF. 
Some scholars would agree that it is important to find causal relations 
between management of SWF and its efficiency to establish an efficient 
and beneficial SWFs. There are several ways to reveal such relations, 
however, most research centres are using following major methods such 
as Resource Governance Index (RGI), Truman scoreboard and Linaburg-
Maduell Transparency Index (LMTI) and Santiago Principles. This paper 
is examined Mongolian SWFs namely Human Development Fund (HDF) 
and Fiscal Stability Fund (FSF) using some of these methods. 
Introduction
In 2018, according to Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute survey, globally 
80 SWFs of 49 countries accumulated 
USD7.9 trillion savings (SWFI, 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2018). 
Among these savings the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund counted alone 
USD1.035 trillion which is around 270 
percent of Norway’s GDP. The SWFs are 
increase their assets not only from natural 
resource revenues, but also of a solution 
whereby government revenue channelled 
straight into the fund and invested 
abroad (Lie, 2018, p. 284). Regarding 
the structure of the Norway’s SWF, the 
first SWF’s operation was not successful 
at all, government experienced failure 
in late 1950’s when the government 
expenditure grew fast and revenue failed 
to keep up. Maybe it is naïve to think 
that, once established, a fund’s structure 
should be immutable to political forces 
or changing circumstances (Truman E. , 
A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Best Practices, 2009, p. 437). This is an 
invitation either to illegal activity or to 
overturning the structure completely. 
But, Norway has altered the structure 
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and orientation of its SWF several times 
since it was first established in 1990, 
whilst a number of SWFs have collapsed 
or have been liquidated in part because 
of they were excessively rigid (Truman 
E. , A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Best Practices, 2009, p. 437). 
This statement shows that SWFs better 
be flexible with their structure, but the 
process of changing structure should 
be straightforward, also should initially 
grounded in relevant law. 
On contrary, some governments failed 
to establish a successful SWF such as 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund (SOFAZ), 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Heritage and 
Stabilization Fund and Venezuela’s 
Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund. 
The government of Azerbaijan served to 
undermine public financial management 
system, financed railway between 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey directly 
from SOFAZ (Bauer A. , Managing 
the public trust: How to make natural 
resource funds work for citizens, 2014, 
p. 16). It is obvious that every SWF has 
experienced different challenges because 
of diverse economic situation, political 
regime and institutional structure and 
other socio-economic factors. From the 
existing SWFs, some are funded from 
fiscal surpluses or foreign exchange 
reserves, while others are funded from 
borrowings from the market. Almost half 
of the SWFs operate by separate entities, 
while the rest consist of a dependent 
entity within Ministry of Finance or the 
Central Bank (Ahmadov, Tsani, & Aslani, 
2011, p. 10). Therefore, it is obvious that 
SWFs are vary in their nature, objectives, 
1 It also named as Fiscal Stability Law
2 http://legalinfo.mn/law/details/7102 
structure, operations and ownership 
which makes difficult to crystalize the 
image of SWFs. 
Mongolia is one of those countries 
struggling to establish an effective 
mechanism to function as an SWF by 
accumulating portions of mining revenues. 
The World Bank has been supporting 
the Mongolian government to improve 
the design of their SWF, and advisors 
are working with the government have 
proposed three SWFs (Robbins & Smith, 
2014, p. 3). These funds are: Fiscal 
Stability Fund, which was established 
concurrently with the Fiscal Stability Law1 
(FSL) in 2010, to stabilize volatile mineral 
revenue an smooth the government’s 
revenue stream; Future Heritage Fund, 
with a long-term investment horizon, to 
convert a portion of Mongolia’s mineral 
wealth to financial wealth for the benefit 
of future generations; Pension Reserve 
Fund, with a long-term investment 
horizon, which serves as a financial 
reserve to guarantee public obligations. 
The SWF is not a new terminology for 
the government of Mongolia, prior the 
government established funds namely 
the Mongolia Development Fund 
(MDF) in accordance with the Mongolia 
Development Fund Law2 in 2007, and 
Human Development Fund (HDF) in 
accordance with the Human Development 
Fund Law (HDFL) in 2009. Unfortunately, 
the government’s over optimistic about 
its projection and realisation of election 
promises entailed the HDF to face a 
shortage of asset and incurred loans. As a 
result, in 2016, the parliament passed new 
Future Heritage Fund Law (FHFL) and 
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abolished the HDFL. The FHF committed 
to be active upon clearing all outstanding 
debts of the former HDF, which were 
estimated to be approximately MNT947 
billion (about USD384 million3) as of 31 
December 2015 (Lee S. M., 2017, p. 2). 
In accordance with the law, assets of the 
FHF will be managed by an investment 
management institution established 
pursuant to the FHFL.
The government adopted the 
FSL in assistance of World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
2011. As a result, the FSF was established 
in accordance with FSL with MNT241 
billion (about USD97.8 million 4) assets. 
The government proposed to increase 
fund’s asset MNT1.4 trillion (about 
USD5.8 million) by 2017, but in reality, 
the FSF was just over MNT326 billion 
(about USD132 million). Overall, the 
FSF asset shows (graph 1) that the fund 
functioned not effective as it proposed 
from government. 
Graph 1. The FSF: Proposed and actual 
assets (MNT billion) (Tuvshin, 2017)
3 MNT947 billion equals USD384 million due to exchange rate of Central Bank of Mongolia. (USD1 = MNT2464 in 
27 July, 2018)
4 MNT241 billion equals USD97.8 million (USD1 = MNT2464; 27 July, 2018)
The above-mentioned situation 
regarding the HDF and FSF entails 
to the question, whether government 
should establish the SWF, why the 
government of Mongolia cannot run 
the SWF as efficient as proposed? A 
simple answer regarding the necessity 
of establishing the SWF, was given by 
Rolando Ossowski, a former assistant 
director at Fiscal Affairs Department 
of the IMF. He unfolded four reasons 
why Mongolian government should 
establish SWF during the conference in 
Ulaanbaatar, 2013 (Lee & Smith, 2013). 
First, natural resource revenues are 
volatile and uncertain. Global prices can 
change to great extent, without warning 
and are almost impossible to project 
reliably. Second, natural resources run 
out; they are exhaustible. The benefits 
must be made to last by transferring 
some (and not all) for future generations. 
Third, Mongolia will be selling most of 
its copper, coal, oil and other minerals 
abroad. This has implications for the 
domestic economy in terms of how the 
non-mining sector competes and in terms 
of macroeconomic stability. Fourth, the 
exploitation of natural resources can be 
a source of corruption and inefficiency. 
Mongolia needs to deliver value for 
money when investing and spending 
tax payers’ and mining revenues. Since 
2007, the Mongolian government has 
not established an effective SWF as 
proposed to public, but the government 
still encouraging to establish a new 
SWF. In January 2018, the Mongolian 
Minister of Mines and Heavy Industry D. 
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Sumiyabazar has stated that “Commodity 
prices at global market increased and 
have been projected to remain at this 
level for next 3-5 years. Hence, a SWF 
should be created within 2018” (MBD, 
2018), and he wishes to manage the 
new SWF by independent state-owned 
enterprise (Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan, 
2018). 
Definition and classification of SWFs
The idiom SWF was first used by 
Andrew Rozanov (Who holds the wealth 
of nations, 2005), later Edwin Truman 
(Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or 
Salvation?, 2010) defined the sovereign 
wealth fund in broad meaning, as “a large 
pools of govern ment-owned funds that 
are invested in whole or in part outside 
their home country.” Similarly, Castelli 
and Scacciavillani (The New Economics 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2012) stated 
as “publicly owned investment vehicles 
with a mandate to transfer wealth to 
future generations by investing in an 
international portfolio of securities and 
assets, including companies.” They both 
excluded investment vehicles primar ily 
geared toward domestic development, 
such as state-owned enterprises or 
national development banks and entities 
financed primarily through transfers of 
central bank reserves. Generally, the 
SWF is a state-owned investment fund or 
entity created by the general government 
for macroeconomic purposes (IWG, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally 
5 ISWF also called Savings or Future Generations Funds. 
6 Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (Chile), Oil Stabilization Fund (Russia, Iran, Timor-Leste)
7 National wealth fund (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Libya, Russia)
8 National Development Fund (United Arab Emirates, Iran)
9 National Pension Fund (Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland)
Accepted Principles and Practices 
“Santiago Principles”, 2008) that is 
commonly established from balance 
of payment surpluses, official foreign 
currency operations, the proceeds of 
privatizations, governmental transfer 
payments, fiscal surpluses, and receipts 
resulting from resource exports (SWFI, 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2018). 
This is the ideal definition to determine 
the main characters of SWFs. 
Sovereign wealth funds are usually 
distinguished by their policy objectives 
and consequent asset allocation. The 
IMF classified SWFs into five types 
according to their purposes and roles. 
These are stabilization funds, savings 
funds5, development funds, pension 
reserve funds, and reserve investment 
funds. The stabilization funds set up 
to insulate the budget and economy 
from commodity price volatility and 
external shocks6; savings funds intended 
to share wealth across generations by 
transforming non-renewable assets into 
diversified financial assets7; development 
funds established to allocate resources 
to priority socio-economic projects, 
such as infrastructure8; pension reserve 
fund set up to meet identified outflows 
in the future with respect to pension-
related contingent-type liabilities on the 
government’s balance sheet9; and reserve 
investment funds intended to reduce the 
negative carry cost of holding reserves 
or to earn a higher return on ample 
reserves, while the assets in the funds are 
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
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still counted as reserves10 (Al-Hassan, 
Papaioannou, Skancke, & Sung, 2013, 
pp. 4-5). It is also important to distinguish 
SWFs from other extrabudgetary funds. 
Extrabudgetary funds (EBFs)
Governments often exclude some 
revenues, expenditures or financing from 
their annual budget laws, using separate 
banking or institutional arrangements 
called extrabudgetary funds to finance 
particular items (Bauer A. , 2014, p. 
13). In technical note of IMF prepared 
by Allen and Radev (Extrabudgetary 
Funds, 2010) claims that extrabudgetary 
transactions are the broadest concept 
and include all revenues, expenditures, 
and financing that are excluded from 
the budget. Extrabudgetary accounts 
are the bank arrangements into which 
extrabudgetary revenues and expenditures 
are paid in and disbursed. Therefore, 
EBFs can be broadly characterized 
as resources managed directly by or 
indirectly by administrative branches 
of the government outside the normal 
budgetary process, and come from three 
main sources including charges for 
government provided goods and services 
(i.e. housing, medical care, education, 
water); administration fees (i.e. passports, 
driver licenses); and income from state 
assets (Wong, 1999). 
Mongolia has established SWFs or 
EBFs?
According to law of Mongolia 
Development Fund (2007) the main 
financial sources of the MDF are income 
tax increase, budget profit, non-spent 
asset of risk fund. The fund will locate 
10 National Investment Corporation (China, South Korea, Singapore)
in state fund and allowed to use as a 
compensation for deficit of budget 
revenue due to force majeure, support 
children and family and invest small and 
medium sized business entrepreneurs 
responsible to contribute economic 
growth. Due to above definitions, the 
MDF is more fit in EBF rather than 
SWF. In contrast, the HDF and FSF were 
established as a successor of MDF to 
accumulate asset from mineral revenue 
and allocate the wealth to Mongolian 
citizens equally, as well as provide an 
economic stability. According to law of 
HDF, the fund was located in special 
account established in Central Bank 
of Mongolia and increase saving by 
accumulating mineral revenue (dividend 
and royalty) and income from investment. 
The characteristics and structure of the 
HDF corresponded the definition of SWF, 
specifically saving fund which is intended 
to share wealth across generations by 
transforming non-renewable assets into 
diversified financial assets. The FHF 
as successor the HDF has established 
to deliver natural resource wealth to 
future generation. The law of FHF stated 
more specifically about accumulating 
revenue, structure of institution and fund 
management. 
The FSF is established in 2010 in 
order to reduce volatility in the budget 
by accumulating the excess revenues 
from the structural basis revenue and 
overcome economic shocks. Due to its 
objective, the FSF is mixture of stability 
and savings SWF. According to the 
definitions, the HDF, FHF and FSF are 
considered to be SWFs. 
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Key factors effecting on SWFs: Why 
resource curse is matter? 
Resource curse is the term used to 
describe the failure of resource-rich 
countries to benefit from their natural 
wealth (Humphreys, 2007). The term-
resource curse was first used in print 
by economic geographer Richard Auty 
in 1993 (Auty, 2002). Scholars have 
different view and studies concerning 
the resource curse effects, some studies 
found no evidence, or mixed evidence, 
of certain resource curse effects. For 
example, Alexeev and Conraad (The 
Elusive Curse of Oil, 2009) refuted that 
large endowments of oil or minerals 
slow long-term economic growth, and 
suggested that natural resources enhance 
long-term economic growth. Similarly, 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (The resource 
curse revisited and revised: A tale of 
paradoxes and red herrings, 2008) 
concluded that resource abundance 
positively affects economic growth and 
institutional quality. Bhattacharyya & 
Hodler (Natural resources, democracy 
and corruption, 2010) studied how natural 
resources can feed corruption and effect 
depends on the quality of the democratic 
institutions and found resource windfalls 
encourage government to engage rent-
seeking which tend to be corrupted, 
however, democracy mitigate this 
process. Michael Ross (What have we 
learned about the resource curse?, 2015) 
claims that higher levels of petroleum 
income lead to more durable authoritarian 
rulers and regimes; more petroleum 
income increases the likelihood of certain 
types of government corruption; and high 
levels of resource wealth tend to trigger 
or sustain conflict particularly in low- 
and middle-income countries. Overall, 
rich natural resource can undermine good 
governance and the quality of institution 
in a society in developing countries or 
countries with weak political institutional 
structure. In other words, mix of weak 
institutions and resource abundance 
causes the resource curse (Mehlum, 
Moene, & Torvik, 2006). 
 One of the main key roles of 
SWF is to mitigate negative economic 
and political consequences of natural 
resource wealth, which often lumped 
together as the resource curse. Jedrzej 
Frynas (Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
the Resource Curse: Resource Funds 
and Governance in Resource-Rich 
Countries, 2007) conducted a research 
hypothesizing that SWFs could mitigate 
recourse curse effects through improving 
governance and reducing price volatility. 
Mongolia is one of the countries 
suffering resource curse, however, there 
is no distinct measurement or definition 
whether country is cursed or blessed. 
In other words, Mongolia is rich of 
natural resource country, but its economy 
and countries development are below 
compared to other developing countries 
without natural resource. 
What are key factors establishing a 
successful SWF? 
Tsani et al., (Governance, 
transparency and accountability in 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Remarks on the 
assessment, rankings and benchmarks to 
date, 2010) claim that strong governance 
structure, transparency and accountability 
remain a key factor of success for the 
SWFs. In other words, strong governance 
and adequate provision of transparency 
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
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and accountability can foster success in 
combating political misuse, rent-seeking 
and corruption in SWF operations. 
NRGI and CCSI (Managing the public 
trust: How to make natural resource 
funds work for citizens, 2014) surveyed 
several SWFs and found a vital key 
elements of good fund governance. 
First key element is setting a single or 
multiple fund objective which should 
be clearly stated in government policy, 
regulation, legislation or even in the 
constitution. Second, creating an effective 
institutional governance including 
effective organizational structure 
and management. Third, establishing 
appropriate fiscal rules necessary given 
the finite and destabilizing nature of 
oil, gas and mineral revenues, and 
discourage overspending and waste by 
limiting a government’s ability to grow 
expenditures too quickly. Fourth, setting 
clear investment constraints to prevent 
“principal-agent” problems, wherein 
the managers of government assets act 
in accordance with personal rather than 
public interests, are a common source 
of conflict of interest. Fifth, making 
extensive information on fund operations 
public by transparency – the degree of 
information is available to outsiders that 
enables them to have informed voice in 
decisions and/or to assess the decision 
made by insiders. Sixth, establishing 
strong independent oversight/audition to 
identify noncom pliance with rules, waste, 
fraud, mismanagement, and suggest or 
enforce corrections (Florini, 2007, p. 5). 
 Currently, there are four well 
known methods namely Santiago-
Principles11, Truman scoreboard, 
11 Produced by International Working Group of the IMF
LMTI and Resource Governance 
Index measuring resource governance, 
transparency and accountability. SWFs 
generally accepted principles and 
practices (GAPP) or Santiago-Principles’ 
main purpose is to identify a framework 
of generally accepted principles and 
practices that properly appropriate 
governance, accountability arrangements 
and investment practices. The GAPP 
is a voluntary based principles and 
practices covers three key areas: i) legal 
framework, objectives, and coordination 
with macroeconomic policies; ii) 
institutional framework and governance 
structure; and iii) investment and risk 
management framework (IWG, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices “Santiago 
Principles”, 2008, p. 5) that members 
of International Working Group (IWG) 
support and either have implemented. 
The GAPP has 24 principles (appendix 
1) which are evaluating SWFs of member 
countries of International Forum of 
SWFs (IFSWF) to emphasise appropriate 
governance, accountability arrangements 
and prudent, commercial investment 
activity. The significance of the Santiago 
Principles is examining SWFs based on 
case studies. 
Edwin Truman (A Scoreboard for 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2007) presented 
the first scoreboard at the Conference 
on China’s Exchange rate policy to 
evaluate each individual SWFs structure 
– SWFs objectives, fiscal treatment, and 
whether it is separate from the country’s 
international reserve; governance – roles 
of the government and the managers, 
whether the fund follows guidelines 
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for corporate responsibility and ethical 
investment behaviour; transparency and 
accountability –investment strategy, 
investment activities, reporting and 
audits; and behaviour – managing its 
portfolio and in the use of leverage and 
derivate (Truman E. , A Blueprint for 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices, 
2009). The scoreboard evaluates the 
SWFs which relies on asking simple 
yes/no questions within four categories, 
including structure of the fund, 
governance of the fund, accountability 
and transparency and behaviour of the 
fund12. From the Truman scoreboard 
(appendix 2) he found that there is a link 
between resource fund governance13 and 
societal governance14, when country’s 
societal governance is high, the resource 
governance tends to be high, but except 
some countries such as Qatar, Oman15, 
Azerbaijan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Kazakhstan16, they are 
in reverse relationship. For example, 
Azerbaijan’s SOFAZ fund considered one 
of high transparent SWFs, but operates in 
a very badly governed society including 
the lack of withdrawal rules, lack of 
parliamentary oversight, highly corrupted 
and opaque, lack of independent media. 
Comparing the indicators of Truman 
Scoreboard researcher concluded that 
effective societal institutions such 
as sound fiscal rules, the quality of 
government budget documentation, a 
free civil society or independent media 
12 There are 33 elements/questions evaluating SWFs, if answer is yes scored it as 1, if no score. Also, answers available 
partial scores of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 (Bagnall & Truman, 2013). All these 33 individual elements equally weighted 
and translated into a 100-point scale. 
13 Representing by the country’s resource governance index in Truman Scoreboard 
14 Representing by country’s political stability index, rule of law index, and regulatory quality index in Truman 
Scoreboard
15 Qatar and Oman have high score in societal governance but considerably low in resource fund governance 
16 In those countries high score in resource governance but considerably lower scores for societal governance
appear to be a prerequisite for minimizing 
resource curse. In contrast, establishment 
of a resource fund may either have 
no effect on mitigating resource curse 
effects, or at best may have a moderating 
effect. Similarly, the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index evaluate SWFs by 
giving scores answering in 10 questions. 
This method is produced by SWFI based 
on publicly open resource. 
In summary, the Truman scoreboard 
and Linaburg-Maduell Transparency 
Index are mostly concentrated on 
transparency of SWF. The assessing 
of questions tended to ask whether the 
information is publicly open or not and 
ranking by scores. The drawback of both 
scoreboards is unable to evaluate those 
SWFs’ information which is confidential 
or published in their own language. In 
contrast, the GAPP or Santiago-Principles 
evaluating SWFs based on information 
provided from local authorities, which is 
more reliable but sometimes obscuring 
the real cause of inefficient governance 
of SWF. For example, Azerbaijan’s 
SOFAZ SWF’s score result shows 
that transparency and accountability is 
increasing, but in reality, the efficiency 
of SWF is not good, and the none of the 
Truman scoreboard, Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index, Santiago-Principles’ 
score does not display that. The RGI only 
method illustrates that Azerbaijan SOFAZ 
resource governance is weak. Therefore, 
the case study and analyze of local 
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official information could exhibit the real 
efficiency of SWF.
 
Economic and natural resource 
overview of Mongolia
Mongolia is a landlocked unitary 
sovereign state sandwiched between 
Russia and China. The 18th largest 
country in the world, population totals 
about 3.2 million. Through the early 
1990’s Mongolia’s economy contracted 
following the loss of support from the 
Soviet Union. Mongolia enacted the 
Minerals Law in 1997, which helped 
attract private investment to the sector, 
and through 2002 Mongolia’s Ministry of 
Mining issued almost 3,000 exploration 
licenses, covering almost 30 percent 
of the country’s territory (Robbins & 
Smith, 2014). Since, the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) increased significantly 
in extracting mineral resource sector. 
Mongolia has abundant mineral 
deposits of uranium, copper, gold, coal, 
molybdenum, fluorspar, tin, and tungsten 
(Thomas, 2012). According to first half 
year report of Mineral Resource and 
Petroleum Authority (MRPA) in 2018, in 
state’s integrated registration list recorded 
65437,9 thousand tons gold (rock) ore, 
29883 thousand tons of copper ore, and 
9662 thousand tons of coal (appendix 
3). The average mineral rents of GDP 
are 20%, and the mining sector take 
alone nearly 80% of all industry which is 
increase about 20% since 2011 (graph 2). 
From giving information it can be seen 
the mining industry is dominant sector 
in Mongolian economy, and its GDP 
significantly reliant on natural resource. 
Regarding the increase of copper 
prices globally and new gold production 
the economic growth averaged nearly 
9% per year in 2004-2008. In early 
2009, the IMF reached a $236 million 
Stand-by Arrangement with Mongolia 
and it emerged from the crisis with 
a stronger banking sector and better 
fiscal management (IMF, 2010). In 
October 2009, Mongolia passed long-
Graph 2. The role of mining sector in the national economy. Green column represents mineral 
rents of GDP, yellow column represents mining rate in industry.
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awaited legislation on an investment 
agreement to develop the Oyu Tolgoi 
(OT) mine, among the world’s largest 
untapped copper-gold deposits (CIA, 
2017). Although the agreement to 
resume a delayed $5 billion underground 
expansion at Oyu Tolgoi was signed 
by the government and Rio Tinto in 
May 2015, ending a row that scared off 
foreign investors, FDI did not increase 
as expected (BTI, 2017). Mongolia has 
agreed with the International Monetary 
Fund and other partners for a $5.5 
billion economic stabilization package, 
according to a statement from the IMF 
in May 2017, which is expected to 
improve Mongolia’s long-term fiscal 
and economic stability as long as 
Ulaanbaatar can advance the agreement’s 
difficult contingent reforms, such as 
consolidating the government’s off-
balance sheet liabilities and rehabilitating 
the Mongolian banking sector. 
The economic and natural resource 
overview of Mongolia shows that 
Mongolia is one the rich and reliant 
on natural resource countries. This 
statement illustrates that Mongolia is 
worth to establish SWFs, but previous 
unsuccessful established SWFs are 
frustrating trust of public whether SWF is 
beneficial for Mongolian economy. 
17 MNT1.5 million equals USD1054 due to exchange rate of Central Bank of Mongolia. (USD1 = MNT1423.74 in 05 
November 2009) But due to exchange rate MNT1.5 now equals USD608. (USD1=MNT2467.76 in 20 August 2018) 
18 MNT500 thousand equals USD358, exchange rate of Central Bank of Mongolia (USD1 = MNT1397.28 in 1st 
December 2012)
19 84th resolution of the Government, 2010. 
20 "Erdenes-Tavan Tolgoi" JSC established with objective to implement the policy of putting deposit of strategic 
importance into economic circulation, conducting mining operation and implementing infrastructure projects in 
accordance with the Law on Minerals (http://www.erdenestt.mn/)
21 57th resolution of the Parliament, 2012. 
22 116th resolution of the Government, 2012. 
The Human Development Fund
The Parliament adopted Law of 
Human Development Fund (HDF) 
in 2009 to implement allocating of 
MNT1.5 million (about USD105417) 
for every citizen from the prospective 
mining riches natural wealth according 
to Action Program of the Government 
of Mongolia for 2008-2012. Revenues 
from mineral deposits planned to be 
distributed to citizens in cash, health and 
social insurance withdrawals, tuition 
and residential payments. In other 
words, the government had an obligation 
accumulate at least USD2.8 billion (the 
population of Mongolia in 2009 was 2.7 
million and the asset have to increase 
in regard of number of population) 
asset through the HDF. As a result, the 
government decided to allocate MNT500 
thousand (about USD35818) in cash for 
every citizen between 2010 and 201219, 
and rest of MNT1 million allocate by 
providing share of “Erdenes Tavan 
tolgoi”20 state owned company21. In 2012, 
the government limited the number of 
citizens who available to acquire shares22 
and counted totally 2.834.837 citizens. 
The limitation was made by date of birth 
and the government registered Mongolian 
citizens those who born before 31 March 
2011. It was an ideal decision not to 
increase the obligation of HDF. 
In 2012, the government have been 
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started to implement Child Money 
Program (child benefit program) 
which providing monthly payments of 
MNT20,000 (about average of USD1123) 
to about one million children (aged 
18 and below). Due to necessity of 
deciding the funding of this program the 
parliament made amendment on Law of 
HDF that the program of Child Money 
available fund from HDF. Since 2012, 
the HDF have received an extra annual 
obligation of about USD11 million for 
payment of Child Money Program which 
is approximately 1% of GDP. Overall, 
the HDF was active between 2010-2016, 
and during this time its expenditure was 
much higher compared to its revenue 
(graph 3) which entailed government to 
get a loan. The HDF budget table clearly 
shows that the total expenditure beyond 
its revenue, the total structure balance or 
over expenditure reached at MNT783,402 
million (about USD318 million24). 
23 MNT20,000 was equal to USD14 in December 2012 and now equals to USD8 in August 2018. Thus, average USD11. 
24 MNT783,402 million = USD318 million 
Why the HDF has established? 
In 18 of November 2009, the 
Mongolian leading news portal news.mn 
reported that Law of HDF, Mongolia’s 
Sovereign Wealth Fund was approved. 
Try to examine, why the parliament 
adopted this law in 2009, not earlier or 
later. On the one hand, the Government 
of Mongolia has signed in agreement 
one of the biggest mining project Oyu 
Tolgoi with foreign investors in 2009. 
Oyu Tolgoi is one of the world’s largest 
new copper-gold mines and is located 
in the South Gobi region of Mongolia, 
approximately 550 km south of the 
capital, Ulaanbaatar, and 80 km north 
of the Mongolia-China border. After 
decades of exploration and drilling, the 
first major discoveries at Oyu Tolgoi were 
made in 2001, leading to several years 
of further exploration which revealed 
the impressive scale of the deposit. 
While exploration continues, even 
Graph 3. HDF’s budget between 2010 and 2016. The blue bar shows revenue of HDF, 
and red bar indicates expenditure, and green bar illustrates the balance between revenue 
and expenditure (MOF, 2018).
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with the reserves currently identified, 
Oyu Tolgoi is expected to operate for 
over 50 years (Tinto, n.d.). The Mining 
Journal of Mongolia (Mining Journal of 
Mongolia, 2013) reported that there are 
a lot of different statements regarding the 
amount of reserves of Oyu Tolgoi mining, 
but according to its feasibility study, 
approved in 2010, stated that its efficient 
or available extraction reserves deposit 
calculated as follows: 3 billion and 380 
million tons of ore, 31.1 million tons of 
copper, 1328 tones of gold, 7601 tones of 
silver, and 81600 tones of molybdenum. 
According to Natural Resource Holdings’ 
study (Global 2013 Gold Mine and 
Deposit Rankings, 2014) the Oyu Tolgoi 
mining ranked in 11th place among 580 
mines by its containing 46,070,529 oz 
gold (table 1). 
In April 2007, a MoU was signed 
between IBRD, IFC, ADB, EBRD 
and the Ministry of Finance providing 
for broad support to the mining sector 
(WB, The Mongolia Minerals Sector 
- Key Issues, 2007). Furthermore, the 
signatories of the MoU stand ready 
to provide the necessary support to 
Government to retain the legal, financial 
and technical advice to conclude the 
negotiations of an investment agreement 
for Oyu Tolgoi. In other words, these 
International Organizations persist that 
there is an urgent need for Mongolia 
to conclude an investment agreement 
for Oyu Tolgoi, sending a strong signal 
to investors that the Government has 
realistic expectations, and is supportive 
of mineral development. A key element to 
attract and sustain investment and growth 
will be to re-establish and maintain the 
legislative and institutional stability, 
which was instrumental in spurring 
investment in Mongolia’s mineral 
sector over the past few years (WB, The 
Mongolia Minerals Sector - Key Issues, 
2007). As a result, The Oyu Tolgoi 
Investment Agreement and companion 
Shareholders’ Agreement establish the 
framework for the development and 
operation of the Oyu Tolgoi copper-
gold mine. The Investment Agreement 
between the Government of Mongolia 
and Ivanhoe Mines Inc LLC, and Ivanhoe 
Table 4. Global 2013 gold mine and deposit ranking (NRH, 2014)
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Mines LLC, and Rio Tinto International 
Holdings Limited, signed in 2009, has 
an initial 30-year term with a 20-year 
extension (Hill, n.d.). 
In addition, the revenue accumulation 
from mining sector in Mongolia has 
significantly increased since 2006. 
According to the World Bank statistics 
the total natural resources rents 
percentage of GDP increased by 7 times 
between 1999-2009 (graph 4). This fact 
shows that from 2006 to 2008 the rents 
from mineral has increased drastically.
On the other hand, the both leading 
parties of Mongolia, the Mongolian 
People’s Party (MPP) and the Democratic 
Party (DP) promised that allocate the 
natural wealth to all citizens if they 
win in parliamentary election in 2008. 
Parliamentary elections were held 
in Mongolia in 29th June 2008. A total 
of 356 candidates ran for the 76 seats 
in parliament, and 45 seats were won 
by the ruling MPP, 28 seats by the main 
opposition party, the DP, 1 seat by Civil 
Will party, 1 seat by Green party, and 1 
seat by independent candidate. According 
to law of government, the ruling party, 
leader of MPP was responsible to 
establish and appoint their cadre for the 
new government. First time ever, the 
prime minister Bayar Sanjaa established 
coalition government, constituted 
ministers from MPP and DP. Both parties’ 
Graph 4. Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) (WB, The World Bank Data, 2018).
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interests were coincided to establish SWF 
and allocate the natural resource wealth 
to their citizens. It is quite reasonable 
that windfall of mineral resource income 
led to establish SWF, but interesting that 
why government decided to allocate 
the money before accumulation asset 
in SWF? If see the overall balance of 
the HDF, early establishment of SWF, 
thereafter miscalculation and deficit of 
asset entailed to get a loan. 
The first quarter of 2018, there are 
some interesting news broadcasted 
related to the Oyu Tolgoi agreement. 
The Financial Times (2018) reported 
that Mongolia’s anti-corruption authority 
has arrested two former prime ministers 
who presided over key negotiations with 
Rio Tinto over its investments in the 
giant Oyu Tolgoi copper mine, upping 
the ante in a probe into the controversial 
project. Bayar Sanjaa, prime minister 
between 2007 and 2009, ambassador to 
the Great Britain since 2016, negotiated 
Rio Tinto’s initial investment after it 
took over the mine from Canadian-listed 
developer Ivanhoe Mines. Saikhanbileg 
Chimed, who held office between 2014 
and 2016, oversaw negotiations for the 
second, and more expensive, underground 
stage (Hornby, 2018). Prior a month, 
a Mongolian former finance minister, 
Bayartsogt Sangajav, has been arrested 
as part of an investigation into suspected 
abuse of power during investment talks 
for the Oyu Tolgoi copper mine in 
2009, the anti-corruption agency said 
(Reuters, 2018). The Swiss Office of the 
Attorney General (OAG) is conducting 
a criminal investigation into a seized 
bank account that court documents 
indicated was used to transfer USD10 
million to Bayartsogt in September 2008. 
Bayartsogt signed an agreement on behalf 
of Mongolia with Canada’s Ivanhoe 
Mines in 2009 to develop the giant 
mine, granting a 66 percent controlling 
stake to the company (Reuters, 2018). 
All alleged politicians are realised from 
arrest because of health condition, and 
cases are under investigation. In some 
point, it is interesting that the date of 
adoption the agreement of the biggest 
mining company of Mongolia and law 
of the HDF is almost coinciding. It 
might be some politicians accelerated 
the time of establishment of the HDF to 
elude from public protest that signed in 
unfavourable agreement for Mongolian 
government. From giving statements, 
may conclude that the HDF established 
not accumulation of assets from natural 
resource, it was a vehicle and tool of 
political institution. 
The Fiscal Stability Fund
In 2010, the Mongolian parliament 
approved the Fiscal Stability Law at 
a time of high commodity prices and 
strong economic growth. Between 
2005 and 2008 the commodity price 
soared in world market, consequently 
the government revenue of Mongolia 
has increased dramatically because of 
expensed proceeds of copper and gold 
mining companies. The price of copper 
increased from USD3675 to USD6731 
per ton, the price of gold increased by 
about 26 percent between 2005 and 
2006 (G.Ragchaasuren, Impact of Fiscal 
Stability Law, 2014). This price soar did 
not last for long time, the price of copper 
fell from about USD7000 to USD5000 
per ton between 2008 and 2009. The 
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commodity price rocketed in 2011 and 
then constantly dropped till 2016 (graph 
5). 
The total expenditure has increased 
drastically when commodity price 
surged, in contrast drop of commodity 
price influenced slightly on national 
expenditure. For example, the 
expenditure has grown 6 times (by 
MNT4 billion) between 2006 and 2011 
Coal price (USD per ton)         Copper price (USD per ton)
Graph 5. Coal and copper market price 2010-2017 (G.Ragchaasuren, et al., 2018, p. 4)
Graph 6. Mongolian general government balance by year. (MNT million) (MSIS, 2018)
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during commodity price relatively 
high. Although, commodity price has 
fallen, the expenditure growth has been 
increasing with same rate between 2011 
and 2016, by MNT4,6 billion (graph 6). 
According to increase of government 
expenditure the total loan has increased. 
The loan between 2006 and 2010 had 
increased by MNT2 billion, then the loan 
has increased dramatically by MNT9.8 
billion between 2010 and 2014. Increase 
of expenditure and loans emerged the 
government establish the FSF. But, 
it is difficult to stay the economy has 
stabilized by establishing FSF according 
to the government outstanding total 
loan data. The government expenditure 
persistently increased until involve the 
IMF’s Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
program in 2017. 
According to the FSL, if the actual 
prices of the main mining products are 
higher than the equilibrated counterparts, 
the actual total revenue exceeds its 
predicted and hence the surplus must be 
saved in the FSF. The government aims to 
increase the FSF over time and maintain 
it to at least 5 percent of GDP thereafter. 
The fund will be used when the actual 
prices of the main mining products are 
realised to be less than the equilibrated 
prices to maintain the stability of fiscal 
positions. Any fund above 10 percent 
of GDP can be invested in specified 
economic activities such that it does 
not affect the stability of the economy, 
especially inflation (G.Ragchaasuren, 
Impact of Fiscal Stability Law, 2014, 
Graph 7. Outstanding loans. (MNT million) (MSIS, 2018)
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p. 21). The FSF revenue is directly 
depended on commodity price, 
particularly copper and coal. It can be 
seen that the FSF income drastically 
increased in 2011 and 2017 when coal 
and copper price was higher compared 
to previous years (graph 5 and 8). The 
fund deposit of FSF has continuously 
decreased since it established, the fund of 
MNT241.0 billion in 2012 plunged down 
into MNT2.3 billion in 2015 (graph 8). 
According to FSL25 the fund’s deposit 
must be not less than 5 percent of GDP, 
but this clause has abolished in 2017. 
If it was valid, the FSF committed to 
accumulate revenue of MNT5.58 billion 
(5 percent of GDP MNT27.8 billion), 
instead of MNT3.25 billion in 2017. 
During the study the information 
about expenditure of FSF was very 
25 Fiscal Stability Law 2010, 5 16(2). This subsection has abolished in 14 April 2017. 
limited and external oversight is 
obscured. Therefore, it was difficult to 
examine to find the causal reason of 
decrease of fund’s resource. Overall, 
the FSF fund deposit is significantly 
dependent on mineral resource price 
specifically copper, coal and gold. 
According to data of fund’s revenue, the 
government tend to spend the deposit 
instead of increase, along parliament 
changing FSL’s clauses when FSF 
unable to commit the regulation. The 
government was also consistently over-
optimistic about its revenue projection 
(by about MNT1 trillion in each year) 
leading to higher budget deficit (Bauer, 
Galindev, Lkhagvajav, Mihalyi, & 
Tuvaan, 2017, p. 27). The debt is 
expected to fall 50 percent of the GDP by 
implementing EFF program. However, 
Graph 8. Stabilization fund revenue (MNT thousand) (MSIS, 2018)
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Bauer et al., (2017) analysis shows 
that 15 percent permanent decrease in 
commodity price is likely to erase all the 
benefits of the IMF program indicating 
how vulnerable the economic situation is. 
Assessing the HDF and FSF through 
Truman scoreboard
There is no officially published 
papers assessed the Mongolian SWFs 
using Truman scoreboard and LMTI. 
Edwin Truman (A Blueprint for 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices, 
2009) published a blueprint for SWF best 
practices based on a scoreboard for the 
current practices of 44 SWFs, excluding 
Mongolian SWFs, maybe because it 
does not have a good practice, or might 
be insufficient information to evaluate 
SWFs. Thus, it motivates to examine 
the HDF and FSF of Mongolia using 
Truman scoreboard and evaluate the 
result in which level the SWF are in. The 
scoreboard has updated its questioning 
elements since its first assessment. The 
initial scoreboard (Truman E. M., A 
Scoreboard for Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
2007) contained 25 elements, the last 
assessment (Truman E. M., Progress on 
SWF Transparency and Accountability: 
An Updated SWF Scoreboard , 2013) 
used 33 elements which constructed 
as questions and are grouped in four 
categories: the first category is structure 
of the fund, including its objectives, fiscal 
treatment, and whether it is separate 
from the country’s international reserves; 
the second category is governance 
of the fund, including the roles of the 
government and the managers, and 
whether the fund follows guidelines 
for corporate responsibility and ethical 
investment behaviour; the third category 
is accountability and transparency of 
the fund in its investment strategy, 
investment activities, reporting and 
audits; and the last category is a 
behaviour of the fund in managing its 
portfolio and in the use of leverage and 
derivatives.
The structure category shows the 
ability of SWF to treat the maintaining 
macroeconomic stability of a country, 
the compliance of regulation of fund, 
and whether SWF has clearly stated its 
investment strategy. The governance 
category more focused on more managing 
and operational issues such as respective 
roles of government and managers, 
procedure of making decision, and 
ethical guidelines. The transparency and 
accountability illustrate the openness 
of SWF operation and structure to 
public, which is important indicator of 
democracy. In other words, Mongolia 
is a democratic country, therefore 
this category may exhibit its level of 
democracy. 
Below table shows the result of 
Mongolian SWFs’ transparency and 
accountability by exploiting the method 
of Truman scoreboard and LMTI.
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No. Questions
Scores Answers
HDF FSF HDF FSF
One. Structure
1.1 Is the SWF’s objective 
clearly stated? (р)
100 100 According the article 1.1 
of HDFL create a savings 
from commodity revenue, 
and allocate to citizens 
equally
According the article 
16.1 of FSL the 
purpose of FSF is to 
maintain the fiscal 
stability of national 
budget in short and 
long term (three years 
and more).
1.2 Is the source of the 
SWF’s funding clearly 
specified?
100 100 According the article 3.2 
of HDFL stated clearly 
that HDF’s funding source 
are dividend and royalty, 
and other profit from 
loans. 
According article 16.2 
of FSL, the FSF will 
fund from structural 
balance of budget, 
unspecified balance of 
reserve and risk fund, 
other incomes allocated 
from parliament 
1.3 Is nature of the 
subsequent use of the 
principal and earnings 
in the fund clearly 
stated? (р)
100 100 According to the article 
4.1 of HDFL, clearly 
stated regulation of the 
earnings. 
According to the article 
6 and 7 of FSL, clearly 
stated principal and 
earnings in the fund. 
1.4 Are these elements 
of fiscal treatment 
integrated with the 
budget? (р)
100 100 According to the article 
18.1 of HDFL, the 
government prepare the 
funds budget and apply 
to the national budget 
through parliament
According to the 
annual Budget Law 
the fiscal treatment 
integrated with the 
budget. 
1.2 Fiscal treatment
1.2.1 Are the guidelines 




0 0 There is no information 
publicly disclosed
There is no information 
publicly disclosed
1.2.2 Is the overall 
i n v e s t m e n t 
strategy clearly 
communicated? (р)
50 100 The article 6.1 of the 
HDFL stated generally 
about investment strategy. 
The article 17 of the 
BFL clearly stated 
about investment 
strategy. 
1.2.3 Is the procedure for 
changing the structure 
clear? (р)
0 0 No information about 
changing structure
No information about 
changing structure
1.2.4 Is the SWF separate 
from the country’s 
international reserves?
100 0 According to the article 
7.1 of the HDFL, fund 
may establish independent 
risk reserve in central 
bank. 
No distinct information 
about reserve
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Two. Governance
2.1 Is the role of the 
government in setting 
the investment 
strategy of the SWF 
clearly established? 
(р)
0 50 There is no clearly 
established investing 
strategy of the SWF. 
According to the 
article 17.1 of the FSL, 
the president of Central 
Bank responsible 
setting the strategy 
of investment, but no 
clear regulation. 
2.2 Is the role of the 
governing body of the 
SWF clearly
established? (р)
100 100 The section three of the 
HDFL stated clearly about 
governing body of the 
SWF. 
In the section three of 
the FSL clearly stated 
role of parliament, 
government and MOF. 
2.3 Is the role of the 




50 100 In the article 21 of the 
HDFL stated general 
managing role of MOF. 
The article 17 of FSL 
clearly stated about 
managers role in 
investment













0 0 No regulation No regulation
2.6 Does the SWF 




responsibility that it 
follows? (р)
0 0 No information No information
2.7 Does the SWF have 
ethical investment 
guidelines that it 
follows? (р)
0 0 No information about 
ethical guidelines
No information about 
ethical guidelines
Three. Transparency and accountability
3.1 Investments strategy implementation 
3.1.1 Do regular reports on 
investments by the 
SWF include
information on 
the categories of 
investments? (р)
50 50 There are some reports 
published on MOF and 
www.iltod.mn websites, 
but not regularly
There are some 
reports published on 
MOF and www.iltod.
mn websites, but not 
regularly
3.1.2 Does the strategy use 
benchmarks? (р)
0 0 No information for public 
about benchmarks
No information about 
for public benchmarks
3.1.3 Does the strategy use 
credit ratings? (р)
0 0 No information for public 
about strategy use of 
credits
No information for 
public about strategy 
use of credits
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3.1.4 Are the holders of 
investment mandates 
identified? (р)
0 0 No information for public No information for 
public
3.2 Investment activities
3.2.1 Do regular reports on 
the investments by the 
SWF include the size 
of the fund? (р)
0 0 There are no reports 
publicly published
There are no reports 
publicly published
3.2.2 Do regular reports 
on the investments 
by the SWF include 
information on the 
returns? (р)
0 0 The are no reports publicly 
published
There are no reports 
publicly published
3.2.3 Do regular reports on 
the investments by the 
SWF include
information on the 
geographic location of 
investments? (р)
0 0 The are no reports publicly 
published
The are no reports 
publicly published
3.2.4 Do regular reports on 
the investments by the 
SWF include 
information on the 
specific investments? 
(р)
0 0 The are no reports publicly 
published
The are no reports 
publicly published
3.2.5 Do regular reports on 
the investments by the 
SWF include
information on the 
currency composition 
of investments? (р)
0 0 The are no reports publicly 
published
The are no reports 
publicly published
3.3 Reports
3.3.1 Does the SWF provide 
at least an annual 
report on its
activities and results? 
(р)
100 0 According to the article 
12.1 of HDFL, the fund 
should publish report 
twice a year
There is no regulation 
about periodic reports.
3.3.2 Does the SWF provide 
quarterly reports? (р)
50 0 According to the article 
12.1 of HDFL, the fund 
should publish report 
twice a year 
There is no regulation 
about periodic reports. 
3.3 Audits
3.3.1 Is the SWF subject to 
a regular annual audit? 
(р)
100 0 According to the article 
22 of HDFL, the external 
auditing required at least 
once a year.
There is no regulation 
about regular auditing. 
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3.3.2 Does the SWF publish 




50 0 There are two audit reports 
publicly disclosed26
There is no annual 
report of FSF was 
found by searching 
following websites of 
MOF, MMHI, NAO
3.3.3 Are the audits 
independent? (р)
100 100 National Audit Authority 
is an independent 
organization. 
National Audit 
Authority is an 
i n d e p e n d e n t 
organization. 
Four. Behaviour
4.1 Does the SWF have 
an operational risk 
management policy?
100 0 According to the article 
14.1 of HDFL, the MOF 
responsible to determine 
and manage the risk. 
No regulation about 
operational risk 
management policy. 
4.2 Does the SWF have 
a policy on the use of 
leverage? (р)
0 100 No policy using of 
leverage
According to article 
17.3.6 of BFL 
prohibited use of 
leverage. 
4.3 Does the SWF have 
a policy on the use of 
derivatives? (р)
100 100 According to the article 
5.1 of HDFL, in order to 
increase the fund revenue 
may invest domestic or 
foreign securities, bond 
and savings.
The article 16 and 17 
explicit the policy on 
the use of derivatives.
4.4 Does the SWF have 
a guideline on the 
nature and speed 
of adjustment in its 
portfolio? (р)
0 0 No guideline on the nature 
and speed of adjustment of 
portfolio. 
No guideline on the 
nature and speed 
of adjustment of 
portfolio.
Overall average score 41 33
Table 1. Truman Scoreboard assessment questions (Truman E. M., Progress on 
SWF Transparency and Accountability: An Updated SWF Scoreboard , 2013)
The average score of the HDF and 
FSF equal to 37 which illustrate a weak 
performance and by SWF scoreboard 
(appendix 4) these funds will rank 
between Brazilian Sovereign Fund (score 
is 30) and Iranian National Development 
Fund (score is 41). The statistic of 
the HDF (graph 3) shows that fund’s 
26 National Audit Authority’s report in 2017. https://www.audit.mn/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/hunii-hogjil-san.pdf 
 National Audit Authority’s report regarding the HDF’s revenue and expenditure in 2014. http://www.audit.gov.mn/
files/report/compliance/hugjil-san.pdf
expenditure surpassed the revenue, thus 
the management was inefficient. Similarly, 
the FSF has weak management because 
it has not been accumulating proposed 
revenue from government. The evaluation 
by Truman scoreboard score also shows a 
weak performance of SWF.26
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1 Fund provides history including reason for creation, origins of wealth, and 
government ownership structure 1 1
2 Fund provides up-to-date independently audited annual reports 1 1
3 Fund provides ownership percentage of company holdings, and geographic 
locations of holdings 0 0
4 Fund provides total portfolio market value, returns, and management 
compensation 0 0
5
Fund provides guidelines in reference to ethical standards, investment 
policies, and enforcer of guidelines
0 0
6 Fund provides clear strategies and objectives 1 1
7
If applicable, the fund clearly identifies subsidiaries and contact information 0 0
8
If applicable, the fund identifies external managers 0 1
9 Fund manages its own web site 0 0
10 Fund provides main office location address and contact information such 
as telephone and fax 0 0
Overall score 3 4
Table 3. Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (SWFI, SWF Institute-LMTI, 2018)
The LMTI illustrates very poor 
result regarding the HDF and FSF’s 
transparency and accountability. It 
also confirms that these funds have an 
inefficient management. 
Assessment through resource 
governance index 
The index has formulated using a 
framework of 149 critical questions 
to define the resource governance 
as the rules, disclosures, oversight 
procedures and measure environment 
allowance whether citizens can hold their 
government to account for managing 
their extractive resource wealth. The RGI 
has 51 questions devoted to measuring 
presence or rules – laws regulations 
or government policy documents; 67 
questions related to disclosures – data 
(e.g. beneficial ownership), processes 
(e.g. what happens before and after 
a licensing round), and availability 
of analytical reports published by 
government agencies and organizations; 7 
questions related to oversight – audits and 
appointment of independent oversight 
bodies. Also, RGI measures the quality 
of the enabling environment – wide 
range of processes in the government, 
parliament, media, and civil society 
that enables or disable the effectiveness 
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No. Questions Scores Answers (HDF)
2.3
SWF existence
Does the country have a natural resource 
fund which is funded by extractive 
resource revenues? 
There are two active SWFs: FSF 
and FHF (replaced the HDF)
2.3.1 SWF deposit and withdrawal rules
a)
SWF withdrawal rule
Are there numeric rules governing size of 
withdrawals from the SWF?
100
According to the article 15.1 of 
HDFL, the Parliament approve 
the amount in accordance with 
Government suggestion. 
b)
SWF national budget review 
requirement
Do rules require that withdrawals and 
spending from the SWF pass through the 
national budget? 
100
According to the article 17.5 of 




Are the numeric rules governing the size 
of deposits into the SWF
100
Annually adopted budget law of the 
HDF by parliament. 
2.3.2 SWF deposit and withdrawal practice
a)
SWF size of fund disclosure 
Does the SWF’s most recent publicly 
available financial report specify the size 
of the fund?
50
The NSOM published the total 
revenue and expenditure, but there 
is no disclosed financial report.
b)
SWF deposit and withdrawal amounts 
disclosure 
Does the SWF’s most recent publicly 
available annual financial report disclose 
deposit and withdrawal amounts? 
50
The MOF disclosed overall 
structural balance of the HDF 
from 2010 to 2016. But no further 
detailed information. 
of resource policies and governance – 
for resource governance. All answers 
substitute of 100 points, which indicate 
country with more than 75 points has a 
good resource governance – a country 
has established laws and practices that 
are likely to result in extractive resource 
wealth benefiting citizens, although there 
may be some cost to society; 60-74 points 
is satisfactory resource governance– 
countries has some strong governance 
procedures and practices, but some 
areas need improvement; 45-59 points is 
weak resource governance – country has 
a mix of strong and problematic areas 
of governance; 30-44 points is poor – 
country has established some minimal 
procedures and practices to govern 
resources, but most elements necessary 
to ensure the society benefits are missing; 
less 30 points failing – country has almost 
no governance framework to ensure 
resource extraction benefits society 
(NRGI, 2017).
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c)
SWF withdrawal rule adherence
From 2015 onwards, has the government 
adhered to the numeric rules governing 
the size of withdrawals from SWFs? 
50
The government promised to 
allocate the revenue for citizens 
which is not accumulated. This 
promise entailed to break the 
withdrawal rule adherence. Adhered 
the rules but not completely. 
d) 
SWF deposit rule adherence 
From 2015 onwards, has the government 
adhered to the numeric rules governing 
the size of deposits into the SWF? 
75
According to HDF annual budget 
law government adhered the deposit 
rule. The numeric size was volatile 
because of commodity price change. 
2.3.3 SWF Investment Rules
a)
SWF domestic investment
Is the SWF prohibited from investing 
in domestic assets without budgetary 
approval?
25
According to the article 5.1 of 
HDFL, in order to increase the fund 
revenue may invest domestic or 
foreign securities, bond and savings. 
No specific regulation.
b) 
SWF asset class rule
Is the SWF prohibited from investing in 
certain asset classes or investment types? 
100
According to the article 24.1 of 
HDFL, prohibited to spend the fund 
any other purposes beyond the law.
2.3.4 SWF Investment Practice
a)
SWF rate of return disclosure
Does the SWF’s most recent publicly 
available annual financial report specify 
the rate of return made on its investments? 
0
No publicly disclosed annual 
financial report. No investments. 
b)
SWF assets held disclosure
Does the SWF’s most recent publicly 
available annual financial report include 
a list of assets held? 
0
No publicly disclosed annual 
financial report. 
c) 
SWF asset class disclosure
Does the SWF’s most recent publicly 
available annual financial report specify 
the fund’s allocation by asset class? 
0
No publicly disclosed annual 
financial report.
d) 
SWF national budget review practice 
From 2015 onward, have withdrawal and 
spending from the SWF actually passed 
through the national budget?
100
The withdrawal and spending from 
HDF has passed through HDF 
budget law by parliament
e)
SWF asset class rule adherence
From 2015 onwards, has the SWF adhered 
to rule limiting asset class or investment 
types?
25
According to the article 5.1 of 
HDFL, in order to increase the 
fund revenue may invest domestic 
or foreign securities, bond and 
savings. Prohibited other investment 
according to the article 24.1 of 
HDFL. 
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2.3.5 SWF Financial Reporting Rules
a)
SWF annual financial reporting 
requirement
Is the SWF required to produce annual 
financial reports?
75
According to the article 20.1 of 
HDFL, the MOF responsible to 
produce the financial reports. 
According to the law no specific 
regulation about time routine. 
b)
SWF financial report disclosure rule
Is the SWF required to publicly disclose 
these annual financial reports?
100
According to the article 23 of 
HDFL, the annual financial reports 
required to disclose through public 
media. 
c) 
SWF financial audit requirement
Do rules require an external body to 
periodically audit the SWF’s annual 
financial reports? 
100
According to the article 22 of 
HDFL, the external auditing 
required at least once a year. The 
auditing result should be reported to 
the parliament. 
d)
SWF legislative review requirement
Is the legislature required to review the 
SWF’s annual financial reports? 25
There is no specific regulation 
about requirement to review the 
annual financial reports. According 
to law of government special funds 
parliament standing committee has 
right to discuss the report if it is 
necessary. 
2.3.6 SWF Financial Reporting Practice
a)
SWF financial report disclosure
Does the SWF publicly disclose its annual 
financial reports?
0
There is no financial report 
published through public media. 
b)
SWF financial audit timeframe
Were there annual financial reports 
audited over the most recently completed 
audit timeframe? 
50




From 2015 onwards, has the legislature 
reviewed the SWF’s annual financial 
reports?
0
There is publicly disclosed 
documents about legislature to 
reviewed the annual financial 
reports. 
Overall average score 53
Table 2. Resource Governance Index – SWF management (NRGI, 2017)27
27 National Audit Authority’s report in 2017. https://www.audit.mn/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/hunii-hogjil-san.pdf 
 National Audit Authority’s report regarding the HDF’s revenue and expenditure in 2014. http://www.audit.gov.mn/
files/report/compliance/hugjil-san.pdf
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According to RGI the FSF got 
42 scores, the HDF evaluated same 
method and got 53 score. It illustrates 
that the HDF is more efficient than the 
FSF. This score does not illustrate the 
resource governance because it covers 
only the management of SWF questions. 
However, the evaluation of the HDF 
(also FHF) will fulfill the examination 
of overall SWF’s management, and these 
are important elements to determine the 
resource governance. Other components 
of resource governance such as enabling 
environment and value realization 
relatively static. The evaluation score 
of the HDF and FSF shows higher 




The overall the Mongolian SWFs 
have been performing inefficiently 
according to assessment of SWF using 
RGI, Truman scoreboard and LMTI. 
There were some limits accessing data 
related to the SWFs, on other hand this 
situation illustrates the transparency and 
accountability of the SWFs. Also, these 
evaluation methods assess the SWF 
according to published regulations and 
availability of reports. In other words, 
it can exhibit the strength of regulation 
and level of transparency, otherwise 
it does not show the causal reason of 
mismanagement. 
The case study of politic and 
economic situation of Mongolia helped to 
find the causal reason of mismanagement 
of SWFs. The result shows that the 
government over optimistic view of 
economic situation and political promises 
lead to mismanagement of SWFs. In 
addition, Mongolia has relatively good 
regulation regarding the SWFs, but the 
government’s commitment is very poor 
following regulation. 
